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บทคัดย่อ
บทความน้ีพูดถึงปรัชญาจริยศาสตร์แห่งความรับผิดชอบของเลวีนัส โดย
หลักๆ แล้วจะเก่ียวข้องกับงานสองช้ินของเขาคือ “Totality and Infinity” และ
“Otherwise than Being” ซ่ึงถือว่าเป็นงานช้ินเอกของเลวีนัส เลวีนัสได้พัฒนา
ปรัชญาจริยศาสตร์ขึ้นใหม่โดยให้ความสำคัญกับความรับผิดชอบต่อผู้อื ่น
(มากกว่า)โดยมิได้ละท้ิง อัตตา หรือ “ตัวฉัน” ให้เป็นเหย่ือคุกคามของสุญนิยม ใน
ทรรศนะของเลวีนัสน้ัน อัตตา หรือ “ตัวฉัน” ซ่ึงมีความเป็นผู้รับ ถูกกำหนดโดย
ความรับผิดชอบท่ีมีต่อผู้อ่ืนอย่างไร้ขีดจำกัด ตัวฉันตกอยู่ภายใต้ผู้อ่ืน ไม่ว่าจะโดย
นัยตามตัวอักษรหรือโดยนัยเชิงสัญลักษณ์ และทรรศนะน้ีเองท่ีทำให้เลวีนัสเช่ือ
ว่า “จริยศาสตร์ คือ การมองของพระเจ้า/ส่ิงศักด์ิสิทธ์ิ” สำหรับเลวีนัสแล้วปัญหา
เร่ืองภาวะเหนือธรรมชาติและปัญหาเก่ียวกับพระเจ้า และปัญหาท่ีว่าอัตวิสัยลด
ทอนลงเป็นสารัตถะไม่ได้ ลดทอนลงเป็นภาวะท่ีกระจายอยู่ในทุกแห่งท่ีจำเป็น
ก็ไม่ได้น้ันต้องไปด้วยกันเสมอ
Abstract
This paper discusses Levinas’s philosophy of ethical responsibil-
ity. The discussion mainly relies on Totality and Infinity and Otherwise
than Being, two works Levinasian scholars unanimously consider as his
masterpieces. Levinas develops a novel philosophical project which gives
priority to the ethical philosophy of the Other without abandoning the
notion of the subject to the imminent threats of nihilism. The subject for
Levinas is one whose passivity and receptivity is such that it is constituted
by its infinite responsibility to the Other. The subject is literally and figura-
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tively subjected to the Other. This allows for his contention that “ethics is
an optics of the Divine”. According to Levinas, The problem of transcen-
dence and of God and the problem of subjectivity irreducible to essence,
irreducible to essential immanence, go together.
Levinas’s philosophy is dominated by and preoccupied with a
single vision. This vision is the self’s inescapable responsibility for the Other.
The Other is Levinas’s term for the human other.2  In many of his writings,
he calls the Other as the stranger, the widow, the orphan, the poor, and
the neighbor, terms which Levinas lifted from the Bible to stress the ur-
gency of the self's ethical obligation towards another human being, and to
acknowledge the non-Greek (Hebraic religion) sources of his philosophi-
cal enterprise. In some instances, the Other is also described as absolute
alterity, infinite, transcendent, invisible, and enigma.
The Other consumed Levinas’s life just as Heidegger was capti-
vated and enthralled by the thought of Being. Levinas says: “There is some-
thing more important than my life. And that is the life of the other. That is
unreasonable. Man is an unreasonable being”.3  Indeed, man’s ineluctable
obligation to his fellow man precedes deliberation and so “unreasonable”.
Before one can ignore or accept the responsibility, the Other has already
made an ethical appeal and has pierced one’s sensibility.
For Levinas, ethics and not ontology is prima philosophia. He
subordinates ontology to ethics because the former effects a relation that
reduces the Other to the comprehension of the thinking ego, stripping the
Other of its singularity or distinctly human qualities.
 Levinas maintains that genuine religion rests on and cannot be
conceived apart from the self’s responsibility for the Other. He is very
emphatic on this claim and asserts: “There can be no ‘knowledge’ of God
separated from the relationship with men. The Other is the very locus of
metaphysical truth, and is indispensable for my relation with God. He
does not play the role of a mediator”.4
Ethics for Levinas is inseparable from religion so that unless the
latter works within the matrix of ethical relationships, it fails to be authen-
tic. A religion grounded solely in abstruse dogmas and excessive rituals
have no meaning whatsoever in Levinas’s perception because this disre-
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gards the justice due to the Other. Without ethics, religion becomes an
empty discourse and a meaningless ritual.
This paper discusses Levinas’s philosophy of ethical responsibil-
ity. The discussion mainly relies on Totality and Infinity and Otherwise
than Being, two works Levinasian scholars unanimously consider as his
masterpieces. Adriaan Peperzak and Richard Cohen hold the opinion that
the former work stresses the transcendence of the other (ethical alterity)
while the latter makes the responsible subject (ethical subjectivity) its cen-
tral topic.5  Both Levinasian scholars agree however that though the two
works differ in emphasis, they still deal with the same concern and that is
the ethical relation of the Same to the Other. This distinction made by
Peperzak and Cohen only reveals Levinas’s novel project of giving prior-
ity to the ethical philosophy of the Other without abandoning the notion of
the subject to the imminent threats of nihilism.
Levinas defends a notion of subjectivity that runs contrary to Struc-
turalism and Post-structuralism, according to which, the subject is consti-
tuted and is eventually dissolved by such external forces as language, myths
and ideologies.6  In his “Preface” to Totality and Infinity, Levinas says
that his book is a “defense of subjectivity” “founded in the idea of infin-
ity”.7  He refuses to accept the postmodern notion of the “death of the
subject” because this averts one’s ethical obligation to the Other.8  He
likewise disapproves of the notion of a modern autonomous subject be-
cause it bypasses alterity and obscures radical difference. As will be shown
later in this article, the subject for Levinas is one whose passivity and
receptivity is such that it is constituted by its infinite responsibility to the
Other. The subject is literally and figuratively subjected to the Other.
The discussion of the main concepts and themes in the above-
mentioned works will be followed by an account of the connection be-
tween Levinas’s ethics and religion, explaining the reason why for Levinas
“ethics is an optics of the Divine”.  According to Levinas, “The problem of
transcendence and of God and the problem of subjectivity irreducible to
essence, irreducible to essential immanence, go together”.9  This link be-
tween ethics and religion will be made in the last section of this article.
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Being without beings: The “There is”
The self, prior to its existence as a subject or existent and as one
which has identity and determination, lays faceless and unknown in the
there is (Il y a). It is immersed in and engulfed by the there is. “What we
call the I is itself submerged by the night, invaded, depersonalized, stifled
by it”.10  In the nocturnal chaos of the there is, the self lacks identity and is
therefore indeterminate.  It slowly acquires determination in its effort to
realize itself by escaping the there is through assimilation, possession,
consumption, absorption of things other than itself.  It stabilizes and de-
fines itself through these self-interested activities. The self “desire[s] to get
out of itself, to rid itself of itself, to ‘save’ itself from the narrow confines of
its material self-relationship, to disburden itself of itself”.11  But in its effort
to give form to its existence, the self is still haunted and threatened by the
there is. It still hears the rumblings of its previous anonymous existence in
spite of its labors to leave it.
The there is is Levinas’s term for anonymous existence, the form
of which is the impersonal verb as in “it rains, or it is warm”.12  It refers to
a state that, where all things are to disappear including the self, it still exists
and “remains, like a field of forces, like a heavy atmosphere belonging to
no one, universal, returning in the midst of the negation which put it aside,
and in all the powers to which that negation may be multiplied”.13  The
there is is “being in general”, pure undifferentiated being.14  Unlike Heidegger
where Being is understood as a donation (es gibt) to which Dasein must
hearken in order to be authentic, Levinas’s there is is a milieu out of which
the self emerges and acquires identity as a self.  While for Heidegger
Being encompasses everything there is in the sense that it confers meaning
and worth to existence, Levinas’s there is refers to a meaningless exist-
ence that enwraps the ego and from which the ego must evade. It is “ex-
istence without existents”, Being without beings and “content without form”.
It is an anonymous, impersonal existence before the hypostasis of the
individuated human subject.  There is no consciousness to experience this
anonymous existence and yet it is not to be equated with pure nothingness
as if it is a substance that has been annihilated.  One cannot approached
the there is cognitively since one is immersed, steeped and bathed in it.
Philip Lawton says, “In approaching the question of the there is, then,
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Levinas attempts to describe, or at least indicate, in language a deduced
experience that precedes language, precedes deduction, and precedes
experience”.15
If there is an appropriate description to the there is where it could
be experienced analogically, it would be the silence and stillness of the
night.  Levinas, in alluding to the metaphor of the night to describe the
there is, explains:
In the night, where we are riven to it, we are not deal-
ing with anything.  But this nothing is not that of pure noth-
ingness.  There is no longer this or that; there is not ‘some-
thing’.  But this universal absence is in its turn a presence,
and we do not grasp it through a thought.  It is immedi-
ately there.  There is no discourse.  Nothing responds to
us but this silence.16
This silence which the there is murmurs Levinas depicts as some-
thing frightening, a “mute, absolutely indeterminate menace”.17  The hor-
ror which the there is engenders is due, not to the fact that things are
covered by darkness and so obscures vision, but to the fact that “nothing
approaches, nothing comes, nothing threatens”.18  As the “dark back-
ground of existence”, the there is is also a monotonous presence, insom-
nia, impersonal vigilance which strip consciousness of its subjectivity.19
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas names the there is as the ele-
ment and he describes it as a state which is neither being, nothing nor
becoming. The element is “wind, earth, sea, sky, air”. It makes the inner
or interior life possible. The ego is within element but it does not possess
it. The ego feels the breeze of the wind, stands on earth, swims in the sea,
is encompassed by the sky and breathes air but it does not use the ele-
ment in the same way it fashions or creates things out of pre-existing ma-
terials. Levinas simply depicts the ego’s relation to the element as “bath-
ing”. The ego is enveloped by the element and it is immersed in it.20
 The element is one-dimensional; it has no width and length but
only depth.21  As depth it is “inextinguishable consummation”, an uninter-
rupted, indeterminate, nocturnal space.22  The element is formless, inde-
terminate, without beginning and without end.  This explains why for Levinas
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the element is impervious and refractory to thought because it is without
qualitative determination and it is not an object which one can approach
and determine by circling around it.
The importance of there is in Levinas’s philosophy is that, for
Levinas, consciousness and individual existence are a hypostasis. Con-
sciousness arises out of this anonymous general existence or being. It is
from the there is that the self builds a home and secure possessions through
its labors. In doing so, the ego begins to form its own identity. The there is
is the medium and the milieu where things for enjoyment are situated.  It is
the “common fund or terrain” which cannot be possessed by any self.23  It
envelops and contains things but which in itself is not contained and envel-
oped.  From and within the elemental, the self lives, appropriates and
possesses things.
The emergence of the self from the there is serves as Levinas’s
strategy for escaping Heidegger’s notion of Being.  If Levinas is to move
beyond Being in order to affirm the Other, he has to find a concept that
does not preclude him from achieving his purpose. And he finds this in his
notion of the there is.  Davis says that the there is “plays a vital strategic
role in Levinas’s escape from what he calls the ‘climate of Heideggerian
philosophy, since it forms the basis of his attempt to cast off the tyranny of
Being”.24  The there is also provides a context in which there is a real
encounter between the self and the Other.25   As was already pointed out
in Heidegger’s ontology, Dasein is solitary whose primary relationship is
with Being and not with others.  The existence of others in Heidegger’s
philosophy is presumed as part of Dasein’s being-in-the-world.  Dasein’s
being in the world is also its being-with-others.
Another importance of the notion of the there is is that, through it,
Levinas is able to come up with the idea that the ego, in its effort to achieve
self-sufficiency, is always menaced by this anonymous existence because
of the uncertainty it brings to the ego’s future.  Also, through the there is,
the self is separated from the infinite and so renders the ego atheistic.26
The ego is a-theistic in the literal sense of the word.  It is not-God, not
the infinite.
92 Prajna Vihara~
From Anonymous Being to being: The Separated Ego or Self
This section elaborates Levinas’s notion of an ego which is master
of itself and of the world that it inhabits. It explains further Levinas’s con-
cept of the Same whose concrete expression is the ego and its totalizing
activities. Levinas calls the world of the ego as interiority, inner self and
psychism.
From the there is emerges the ego whose essence is to persist in
its own being.  For Levinas, relatively agreeing with Spinoza, all beings
are driven by their essence to strive to become themselves. Every being is
attached to and lives for itself. Each is innately egoistic and inclines to-
wards narcissism. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas takes time to describe
the egoistic character of the self, which he describes as enjoyment, nour-
ishment and love of life.  Enjoyment is for Levinas the primordial exist-
ence.
The ego, as was already discussed in the preceding section, is like
the there is in which it is immersed. It is faceless, anonymous and without
an identity. But it slowly and gradually arises from its anonymity by engulf-
ing objects in there is in order to establish itself as separate ego. Levinas
describes this process of assimilating and taking possession of things in
the there is as “living from”.  The ego, being corporeal and endowed with
sensibility, lives from “‘good soup’, air, light, spectacles, work, ideas sleep,
etc”.27  It is concerned with the worldly necessities of life. Things from the
sensible material world are “swallowed, used, enjoyed, integrated in knowl-
edge or practice” in order for the ego to endure in its being.28  Hence,
living from establishes the ego’s identity.  The ego absorbs the other in
order to constitute and maintain itself as the Same.  It retains itself as the
Same as it changes by appropriating things to itself.29
Levinas regards life in its elementary form as happiness and en-
joyment. Suffering is possible because life is happiness in the first place. It
“presupposes a self whose natural tendency is to enjoy the world”.30  He
says:
The life that is life from something is happiness. Life is
affectivity and sentiment; to live is to enjoy life. To despair
of life makes sense only because originally life is happi-
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ness. Suffering is a failing of happiness; it is not correct to
say that happiness is the absence of suffering.  Happiness
is made up not of an absence of needs, whose tyranny
and imposed character one denounces, but of satisfac-
tion of all needs. . . . Happiness is accomplishment; it
exists in a soul satisfied and not in a soul that has extir-
pated its needs, a castrated soul.31
Moreover, though the ego realizes that it lives in a strange world
where things are either subservient or indisposed to it, still it does not find
these things radically opposed to its existence. The world is still pleasant
and a source of enjoyment to the ego. As Davis explains: “The strange-
ness of the world is its charm, a cause of happiness.  Jouissance names
the process by which the subject makes itself at home in an environment
where otherness is not a threat to be overcome, but a pleasure to be
experienced”.32  Levinas explains this point crisply:
The primordial relation of man with the material world
is not negativity, but enjoyment and agreeableness
[agr?ment] of life. It is uniquely with reference to this agree-
ableness-unsurpassable within interiority-that the world
can appear hostile, to be negated and to be conquered. If
the insecurity of the world that is fully agreed to in enjoy-
ment troubles enjoyment, the insecurity cannot suppress
the fundamental agreeableness of life.33
For Levinas, the world is fully available to the ego for its nourish-
ment. It gives the ego a way of gratifying itself. The world as other is
transformed into the Same and this for Levinas is “the essence of enjoy-
ment”.34  As enjoyment, the self is at home in the world. It enjoys its
economic life. The world, which the self inhabits, is a world where it finds
enjoyment and not merely derives its sustenance.  Enjoyment is spontane-
ous and it has no other goal except enjoyment itself.
Life is not the naked will to be, an ontological Sorge
for this. Life’s relation with the very conditions of its life
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becomes the nourishment and content of that life. Life is
love of life, a relation with contents that are not my being
but more dear than my being: thinking, eating, sleeping,
reading, working, warming oneself in the sun. Distinct from
my substance but constituting it, these contents make up
the worth [prix] of my life. When reduced to pure and
naked existence, like the existence of the shades Ulysses
visits in Hades, life dissolves into a shadow.  Life is an
existence that does not precede essence.  Its essence
makes up its worth [prix]; and here value [valeur] consti-
tutes being.  The reality of life is already on the level of
happiness, and in this sense beyond ontology.  Happiness
is not an accident of being, since being is risked for hap-
piness.35
The ego absorbs and consumes the things in the world. It “lives
from” the world. Things are consumed and absorbed not for any utilitarian
purpose like survival and the satisfaction of a need but for the sake of
enjoyment. “To enjoy without utility, in pure loss, gratuitously, without
referring to anything else, in pure expenditure__this is the human”.36  The
essence of existence is enjoyment. This kind of life manifests not only the
physicality or concreteness of the ego but also its self-centeredness, which
for Levinas is a kind of innocence. This is an unconscious egoism devoid
of any malice. Wyschogrod explains this poignantly:
In acknowledging man as need Levinas is maintaining
dialectically that from the point of view of a developed
ethical consciousness man is hopelessly guilty, but from
the point of view of natural man he remains innocent.
Natural man thus behaves no differently from fallen man,
but natural man simply has not experienced the condi-
tions that make his behavior be nonethical behavior. He
has not yet encountered the upsurge of the Other.37
What the ego incorporates in enjoyment is not the Other but the
other. The former puts up a stand before the transcendental ego and re-
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fuses to be included in the world the ego constructs for itself. The latter is
absorbed into the Same and is the “source of jouissance’ or enjoyment.
The Same, as it assimilates the Other, “confirms totality” while the resis-
tance of the Other “reveals infinity”.38  Levinas emphatically makes a dis-
tinction between the other and the Other.
The other metaphysically desired is not “other” like
the bread I eat, the land which I dwell, the landscape I
contemplate, like, sometimes, myself for myself, this “I”,
that “other”.  I can “feed” on these realities and to a very
extent satisfy myself, as though I had simply been lacking
them. Their alterity is thereby reabsorbed into my own
identity as a thinker or a possessor. The metaphysical
desire tends toward something else, toward the abso-
lutely other.39
The ego finds enjoyment in the world because, as a bodily living
entity, it has sensibility. Sensibility is the ego’s way of first engaging with
the world of things. It is the ego’s mode of enjoyment. Sensibility is even
enjoyment itself.40  The ego, as sensibility, has needs which it must satisfy.
It has affectivity and sensation which renders it to encounter and enjoy the
contents of life.
Levinas makes a careful distinction between need and desire.  Need
is natural while desire is spiritual. The former, he says, can be satisfied by
something finite that the ego lacks, while the latter is insatiable because it
intends the infinite. As corporeal, the ego seeks satisfaction for its needs
by appropriating the world to itself while remaining within itself.41  “It
would coincide with the consciousness of what has been lost; it would be
essentially nostalgia, a longing for return”.42  Need converts the “other
into the same by labor”.43  Desire, on the other hand, moves towards that
which cannot complete it.  It desires the Good, which as desired does not
fulfill it, but deepens it.44  It is the desire for the “alterity of the Other and of
the Most-High”.45  Desire is nourished by its hunger. It wrenches the ego
from its self-sufficient existence and directs it to the beyond__the Other.46
Thus, it is the Other’s egression that answers the deepest desire, which
propels the ego to goodness. Levinas however argues that a need resides
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in desire. Need is the primary movement of the Same and as such it sur-
mounts, suspends and obliterates the alterity of the world.47  “The human
being thrives on his needs; he is happy for his needs”.48  While this is true
for the primordial natural life, the ethical life is animated by desire for the
Other which as Infinite awakens this very desire in the self.  Need and
self-gratification is what characterizes the natural self while desire and
responsibility for the Other is what constitutes the subjectivity of the ethi-
cal self.
The desire for the Other however is not possible if need, which is
a natural inclination, is suppressed. As Levinas writes, “Having recog-
nized its needs as material needs, as capable of being satisfied, the I can
henceforth turn to what it does not lack. It distinguishes the material from
the spiritual, open to Desire”.49  In other words, the self cannot open its
arms to embrace the Other unless it has satisfied its biological and material
needs.
It must be noted however that Levinas’s notion of the ego as
“living from” the world is in stark contrast to Heidegger’s Dasein as “be-
ing-in-the-world”. Living from nature does not denote that the ego con-
sciously confronts the world and utilizes it for its own needs. It does not
also mean that things from which the ego lives from are a “means of life”.50
It likewise does not mean that the ego is saddled by anxiety as a conse-
quence of its awareness of its own death. Rather, living from nature is the
ego’s primordial immersion in the there is prior to making nature an ob-
ject of representation and praxis. It is the ego’s experience of nature at the
level of sensibility before this experience is brought to the level of con-
scious intentionality. Levinas says: “The sensibility we are describing start-
ing with enjoyment of the element does not belong to the order of thought
but to that of sentiment, that is, the affectivity wherein the egoism of the I
pulsates”.51  Or in the words of Peperzak, “Ego is concerned and takes
care of itself before it becomes conscious of itself”.52
Sensibility does not constitute the world as representation but it
constitutes “the very contentment of existence”.53  Here, Levinas is reject-
ing Husserl’s notion of a transcendental ego whose contact with the world
is first and foremost an “objectifying relation” “mediated through repre-
sentation”.54  The objectifying vision of the ego through representation
precludes the appearance of the Other as a genuinely other to the self. But
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in the level of sensibility, the presence of the Other is strongly felt and he is
regarded with esteem and warm affection.55  Peperzak makes an interest-
ing remark on the significance of sensibility.  He explains that “the impor-
tance of Levinas’s description of sensibility lies in its overcoming the old
dualism of body and spirit. In enjoying the world, I am a body that feels
itself as an affected and affective, corporeal and sensitive I, not as a
disincarnate, invisible, or ethereal consciousness”.56  Though sensibility,
like representation, is reflexive and incorporates the other to itself, Levinas
thinks that the ethical encounter between the self and the Other is princi-
pally in the sensible level of experience before it is raised to conscious-
ness. The poverty of the Other wounds and painfully affects the ego at the
level of sensibility rather than cognition.
For Levinas, the ego does not rise above the world as it seems in
Husserl’s transcendental ego. It has a body which assigns it to inhabit the
world. Through the body, the ego labors in order to satisfy its needs.  The
body, having needs, is the ego’s way of overcoming the alterity of what
the ego lives from. “For a body that labors everything is not already ac-
complished, already done; thus to be a body is to have time in the midst of
the facts, to be me though living in the other”.57  Levinas thinks that when
the ego first relates with alterity, it does so not on the cognitive level but in
the immediacy of bodily contact and experience. The body for Levinas is
indigent and naked, and as such it derives nourishment from the world it
inhabits. The body however is not an instrument that the ego uses in order
to satisfy its needs. It is not like other things because it is the ego incarnat-
ing itself in the world. The ego as a body is already concretely involved in
the world before it affirms and represents the world.58
The ego as “living from” exhibits its dependence on the things in
the world. Although as enjoyment, the ego, like a Leibnizian windowless
monad, has acquired independence and mastery of the world, it also re-
lies on the world in the sense that its enjoyment is conditioned by it. The
ego can only enjoy what is made available to it by the world. While it is
true for example that in the enjoyment of food, sunlight, fresh air, shelter,
etc., the ego becomes nourished, warm and healthy, and thus gains inde-
pendence and self-sufficiency, it is also determined by the world in the
sense that its identity is constituted by it. Levinas calls this “mastery in this
dependence”.59  Hence, the ego is a master and a slave of what it lives
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from.60
It was explained above that the ego needs to fill its lack or empti-
ness by appropriating things in the there is. It finds enjoyment in doing
such activity. In spite of the ego’s happiness and enjoyment, it is still dis-
turbed, haunted by the rumbling and horror of the there is. According to
Peperzak, “Sensibility is an incurable unrest dependent on the contingen-
cies of a future that remains uncertain. After moments of happiness, in
which we feel no care, the menaces of the world come back”.61  As one
which has sensibility, the ego still finds its happiness insecure. Though the
ego finds enjoyment in the elemental, yet its happiness lies in assimilating
what is other than itself and never of itself. Levinas calls this “an enchainment
to self, the very enchainment of identification”.62  Enjoyment, although it
manifests the freedom and independence of the ego, is still an insuffi-
ciency, an independence based on dependence.63  The ego is menaced by
the insecurity and anxiety posed by the there is. And so it takes a slice or
piece from the elemental in order to build its own home and accumulate
possessions through labor.64  “Labor” for Levinas “recoups the lag be-
tween the element and the sensation”.65  It “can surmount the indigence
with which not need, but the uncertainty of the future affects being”.66  The
ego, confronted by the uncertainty of the future, withdraws in a dwelling in
order to find security and stability. This is what Levinas calls inhabitation
and economy.67  This is the economy of existence where things are in-
gested to the “establishment and maintenance of a house or home”.68
Hence, “The ‘law’ (nomos) of ego’s ‘home’ (oikos) rules the universe”.69
For the ego to escape the horror of existence it must acquire
mastery through possession, recollection and representation of the things
in the world by extending its domain in and dominion over them. “Posses-
sion masters, suspends, postpones the unforeseeable future of the ele-
ment-its independence, its being”.70  Consciousness arises as a conse-
quence of planning and annexing things, which actually refers to the ego’s
economic activities, in order to find security in the future and allay disqui-
etude.71  The indeterminacy of the there is from which the ego arises
causes the ego to think and reflect about its own being. “The indetermina-
tion of the future alone brings insecurity to need, indigence: the perfidious
elemental gives itself while escaping”.72  “Hence the subject contemplating
a world presupposes the event of dwelling, the withdrawal from the ele-
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ments (that is, from immediate enjoyment, already uneasy about the mor-
row), recollection in the intimacy of the home”.73  Without a home, the ego
has no orientation and is drowned in the there is.74
From the above discussion regarding the notion of the self as en-
joyment, Levinas is moving beyond Husserl in terms of prioritizing sensi-
bility over representation. While Husserl emphasizes the intentional char-
acter of consciousness that founds subjectivity, Levinas rules this out say-
ing that consciousness “is not the ultimate legitimation of subjectivity” and
subordinates this to the intentional character of sensibility, which translates
to responsibility for the Other.75  This prepares him for his phenomenol-
ogy of the Other, the existence of whom is encountered in sensibility. In his
Otherwise than Being, Levinas reinterprets and extends further this no-
tion of sensibility to a point where it is now understood as contact with the
other’s skin and proximity. There is now a deepening of the meaning from
a notion of sensibility which allows the self to appropriate in the imme-
diacy of the sensuous elements such as light, air, water, food, etc. to a
notion where the self is now construed as sensitivity to the needs of the
Other.  In other words, sensibility in Totality and Infinity is understood
within the context of interiority and enjoyment while in Otherwise than
Being, sensibility is construed as the self’s openness, embodied expo-
sure, disposal, subjection, vulnerability, passivity and susceptibility towards
alterity.  The former notion of sensibility prepares for the latter notion
since a self which does not enjoy and does not experience pain and suf-
fering cannot be ethical or become responsible for the Other. As Levinas
says, “only a being who eats can be for the other”.76  A being who knows
and experiences misery is vulnerable to the miseries of others.
Levinas’s discussion of the interiority of the self presages the ap-
proach of the Other from a dimension of height.  The self, while enrap-
tured by its delight of the world, cannot avoid the presence of the Other.
Though the self is solitary and independent, it is suddenly confronted by
the comportment of the Other who challenges his autonomous existence.
Levinas’s phenomenology of the self as interiority and economy is part of
his strategy to leave the climate of Heidegger’s thinking of Being. Levinas
says: “To be I is to exist in such a way as to be already beyond being, in
happiness”.77
Levinas maintains that no real ethical relationship is possible if the
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ego and the Other are not separate. “Separation . . . . is solitude, and
enjoyment__happiness or unhappiness__is isolation itself”.78  “Egoism, en
joyment, sensibility, and the whole dimension of interiority__the articula-
tions of separation__are necessary for the idea of infinity, the relation with
the other which opens forth from the separated and finite being”.79
Levinas’s phenomenology of the self as enjoyment, as interiority, is neces-
sary in order to punctuate the independence of the ego from any form of
totalization. Unlike Hegel’s philosophy where the self is a moment of and
subsumed under an absolute self, which to Levinas’s judgment is simply a
neuter term that neutralizes alterity, the self as interiority is sovereign and
master of his own dwelling. Only through the self’s independence can
Levinas establish the ethical relation between the self and the Other with-
out constituting a totality.
For Levinas, the egoism of the ego is important for the possibility
of ethical metaphysics.  Egoism should rather be viewed as separation of
desire and the desired so as to maintain the claim that the desired does not
fulfill desire but deepens it. In Levinas’s mind, desire provokes the ego to
the elusive Other. Egoism, however, must not also be construed as an
opposition to the Other or else this opposition assumes a neutral stand-
point which would form a “totality encompassing the same and the other”.80
Levinas describes the egoism of the ego as “an incomparable unicity; it is
outside of the community of genus and form, and does not find any rest in
itself either, unquiet, not coinciding with itself”.81  Hence, man is a unicity
which recoils from Being or essence.
Subjectivity and the Face of the Other: Responsibility to-and-for-
the-Other
This section gives an account of the notion of the Other who ap-
pears, confronts and challenges the egoism of the self-same. The self, in
its encounter with the Other, becomes cognizant of the infinity of the Other.
As infinite, the Other lies beyond the range of the self’s synthesizing gaze.
Levinas asked: “But how can the same, produced as egoism, enter into a
relationship with an other without immediately divesting it of its alterity?”82
It was seen in the previous section that the ego is naturally egoistic, with-
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drawing and seeking refuge into a home it constructs in order to shelter
itself from the dubious future and anonymous being. If this is so, then how
is responsibility for the Other induced in the self as basically solitary, ego-
ist, blind and “entirely deaf to the Other?”83  How can a monadic ego truly
encounter another person?84  Here, Levinas proffers an ethical subject
who is neither master, virile, sovereign nor autonomous but one who is a
dedicated and generous servant to his fellow human being. He defends a
selfless and affective subject who, by being faced by the Other, is sum-
moned to sacrifice and give up his comfort and even his life for the sake of
the Other. His notion of a subject whose identity is formed by obsessive
responsibility for the Other supplants the hegemonic subject reduced to
consciousness by Western philosophy. “The reduction of subjectivity to
consciousness”, Levinas observes, “dominates philosophical thought, which
since Hegel has been trying to overcome the duality of being and thought,
by identifying, under different figures, substance and subject”.85
Ethics as Critique of the Freedom and Hegemony of the Self.
The ego’s self-absorption, its being at home and solitary in the world, is
interrupted and opened up by the presence and approach of the Other.
Levinas succinctly puts it this way: “The presence of the Other is equiva-
lent to this calling into question of my joyous possession of the world”.86
He names as ethics this state of affair where the Other thwarts the self’s
enjoyment and freedom.87  He construes ethics not merely as a theoretical
and norm-giving discipline. He does not also understand it as a theory
based on “rationalist self-legislation and freedom (deontology), the calcu-
lation of happiness (utilitarianism), or the cultivation of virtues (virtue eth-
ics)”.88  Likewise, he does not think that ethics must be founded on “altru-
istic will, instinct of ‘natural benevolence’ or love” because this would
imply that they are attributes inherent in the subject and this runs contrary
to the self's egoistic nature.89  For Levinas, the subjectivity of the self is
shaped by and within the matrix of the ethical relation.  Hence, ethics is
more of a “face to face” meeting between the self and Other, where the
latter, as an almost overwhelming presence (which Levinas calls ‘the other
in the same’), stands as a critique of the “liberty, spontaneity and cogni-
tive enterprise of the ego that seeks to reduce all otherness to itself”.90
As a critique, ethics always keeps vigil of the possible threat posed
by totalizing philosophical systems and the ways of life these systems en-
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gender. It will see to it that the relation between the self and the Other is
not subsumed under a unifying and mediating principle which issues from
and still prioritizes the sovereign ego. Levinasian ethics also stresses the
urgency and compelling responsibility that the self must immediately as-
sume as a result of its passivity for the Other. This ethical exigency is
enkindled by the Other’s proximity to the self. Levinas criticizes previous
ethical theories because they are preoccupied with matters concerning the
validity and the justification of moral standards. These theories seem to
overlook the necessity of responding immediately to the ethical demand
exhibited by the Other. More importantly, these ethical theories hinge on
human reason or freedom which, according to Levinas, tends to lapse into
or even encourage egoism and eventually violence. Moreover, Levinas’s
ethics sheds light on the problem raised by some ethicists since Hume that
the ought (moral obligation) cannot be derived from the is (fact). Viewed
from within Levinas’s ethics, this problem does not yet exist since it dwells
on the plane of consciousness. Ethics for Levinas is prior to theoretical
philosophy.  It is “the immediate experience of another’s emergence” which
“contains the root of all possible ethics as well as the source from which all
insights of theoretical philosophy should start”.91
The presence of the Other, according to Levinas, makes the ego
feel guilty and ashamed. But this culpability, as will be shown later in this
section, does not necessarily obliterate the ego, for such effacing would
constitute violence. For Levinas, the Other is the unexpected visitor or
stranger who shakes and disturbs “the being at home with oneself”.92  The
epiphany of the Other makes the ego ask whether in his happy existence,
in his “being-in-the-world” or “place in the sun”, he is not depriving the
Other of his own rightful place in the world whom he has “already op-
pressed or starved, or driven out into a third world”.93  Unlike other be-
ings, the Other defies representation in thought and thus cannot be assimi-
lated into the ego’s world (as in Husserl’s transcendental constitution).
The Other rather awakens the self to its real authentic existence-a life
anchored in the ethical relation referred to by Levinas as metaphysical
desire. The revelation of the Other poses a challenge to the ego’s monadic
existence and its power to engulf things outside of its own milieu. The
Other represents an excess to thought, a transcendence and a “Good
beyond Being”.  It is not a phenomenon falling within the noesis-noematic
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phenomenological schema but an enigma, an entity that surprises and ad-
dresses the self that wallows in its complacent existence in the world.94
He signifies an unreachable height that commands and demands infinite
and unconditional responsibility.
Levinas says that the presence of the Other is the ego’s source of
meaning, liberating it from its previously egoistic existence. In an inter-
view, Levinas enunciates the following: “My ethical relation of love for the
other stems from the fact that the self cannot survive by itself alone, cannot
find meaning within its own being-in-the-world, within the ontology of
sameness”.95  This is because the Other is the heart of the same, the very
psyche of the soul of the self.96  The very structure of the self is its respon-
sibility for the Other. The self is “one-for the other”. If the Other is the
heart of the self, the self is the lung and support of the Other.
Exposure. The ego finds its life weighed down by the there is
unless it answers the ethical claim of the Other.  It suffers from “ennui, that
is, from enchainment to itself, where the ego suffocates in itself due to the
tautological way of identity”, failing to open its home and offer it to the
Other.97  The self, in its effort “to be” (or as conatus essendi), will be-
come restless if it keeps on “equalizing difference” or otherness to itself.98
This uneasiness or anguish however is due neither to the self's preoccupa-
tion with itself nor to its “existential ‘being-for-death’”, but due to its ex-
posure and proximity to the Other which Levinas describes as “the an-
guish of contraction and breakup”.99  Levinas explains:
This contraction is not an impossibility to forget one-
self, to detach oneself from oneself, in the concern for
oneself. It is a recurrence to oneself out of an irrecusable
exigency of the other, a duty overflowing my being, a duty
becoming a debt and an extreme passivity prior to the
tranquility, still quite relative, in the inertia and materiality
of things at rest.  It is a restlessness and patience that
support prior to action and passion. Here what is due
goes beyond having, but makes giving possible.  This re-
currence is incarnation.  In it the body which makes giving
possible makes one other without alienating.100
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For Levinas, hypostasis__the emergence of the self from anony-
mous being__is exposure to the Other.101  And this exposure so strikes the
self that it returns and contracts to itself, feeling the weight of responsibility
inflamed by the Other. Exposure is the “risky uncovering of oneself, in
sincerity, the breaking up of inwardness and the abandon of all shelter,
exposure to traumas, vulnerability”.102  The recurrence of the self is not a
process of self-conscious activity where consciousness reaches out to
external objects and returns to itself fully aware of its own being.103  This
is Hegel’s philosophical project.  Rather, this recurrence is an assignation
where the self’s responsibility for the Other is unique and irreplaceable.
The intentional nature of the self to grasp what is other than itself is de-
flected by the human Other (or what Levinas calls the ‘inversion of inten-
tionality’)104 and goes to affect the very core of the self and prompts him
to acknowledge and respect that which it cannot be integrated into its
being. Levinas makes use of a variety of terms to describe this condition
where the Other affects the nucleus of the self. He says that the self is
hostage, disturbed, interrupted, traumatized, beleaguered, persecuted,
deposed, besieged, assailed, expelled, stripped, dislodged, attached, ex-
posed, denuded, defeated, extradited, deported and subjugated.105  All
these can be summed up in a central theme in his second major work
(Otherwise than Being): namely, substitution.
In Otherwise than Being, Levinas now sets up the precedence
of the notion of a subject being affected in its passivity and susceptibility
by the Other over the notion of a subject in Totality and Infinity as first
and foremost sensuous and jouissance. The subject in the earlier work
seeks to escape from the there is in order to constitute itself as a subject
that enjoys its immersion in the world.  But in the second major work, it is
alterity or the Other that makes the ego recoil to itself in order to assume
responsibility not only for itself but for the entire universe.106  The ego is
made to bear the weight of the world upon its shoulder like Atlas in Greek
mythology. This is then the origin of his infinite responsibility to the Other.
As will be explained in the paragraphs that will follow, the self is singled
out, the reason of which it knows not, to put himself in the place of the
Other (substitution) and to act as the very breath of his life.
The Face of the Other. Levinas argues that the Other discloses
himself as a face. The face is the “way in which the other presents himself,
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exceeding the idea of the other in me”.107  “The face approaches with a
glance, a word, a gesture or a movement of the whole body. It addresses,
expresses an appeal to, and makes demands of the Self”.108  The Other,
which reveals himself as a face, touches the self to the very core of its
being. The look of the Other pierces the heart of the self so that the self
cannot evade the Other’s call for help, generosity and sacrifice. This look
is the look of the poor, the orphan and the widow that begs for mercy and
compassion. The presence of the Other that strikes the very being of the
self Levinas would call passivity, affectivity, vulnerability, persecution and
trauma. Some  of these themes would be elaborated later in this section.
The self encounters the face in sensible experience but it also tran-
scends that experience.109  The face of the Other is not a phenomenon
that can be turned into an object of representation. It is not the physical
face that one sees because it is beyond perception and cognition. The
Other as the face is not exposed to the thematizing gaze of the self but
approaches the self from outside its horizon. The Other appears not ac-
cording to the self’s initiative or illumination but according to its own light.110
“The relation with the face is not an object-cognition. The transcendence
of the face is at the same time its absence from this world into which it
enters, the exiling [depaysement] of a being, his condition of being stranger,
destitute, or proletarian”.111  Thus, as someone who appears outside of
the self's vision, world, home and horizon, the status of the Other is then
“absolute”. He is not limited or confined by the self’s synthesizing knowl-
edge because he absolves from it. He continually slips away from the
self's intellectual grasp. And as such, he is homeless, a total stranger who
deserves to be taken care of. The Other is also not just a mere exteriority
which lies outside of the self; the Other “approaches me not from outside
but from above”.112  For this reason, the Other is not wholly in the ego’s
site but he is transcendent.113
Although the face is opaque to physical and intellectual vision, it is
nevertheless the living presence and expression of the Other who continu-
ally unmakes and eludes the thematization of the Same. “The face is a
living presence; it is expression. The life of expression consists in undoing
the form in which the existent, exposed as theme, is thereby dissimu-
lated”.114  Precisely as expression, the face defies the power of the self to
contain the Other in its thought, for the Other “is incessantly and infinitely
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withdrawing and surpassing its revelations”.115  The face reveals, and so
the self wants to make it present in its consciousness. And yet the more
the self attempts to represent it, the more it withdraws. This impossibility
of catching up manifests the infinity and radical alterity of the Other. The
face of the Other evinces indigence and defenselessness and so it begs
and summons the self to deeds of kindness and generosity. And because
the face expresses misery and helplessness, the face of the Other com-
mands the self to respond by doing something to relieve the Other of his
suffering. Paradoxically, this command makes the Other lord and master
in his frailty. “The Other qua Other is situated in a dimension of height and
of abasement__glorious abasement; he has the face of the poor, the stranger,
the widow, and the orphan, and, at the same time of the master called to
invest and justify my freedom”.116  As Levinas describes:
This gaze that supplicates and demands, that can sup-
plicate only because it demands, deprived of everything
because entitled to everything, and which one recognizes
in giving (as one “puts the things in question in giving”)__this
gaze is precisely the epiphany of the face.  The nakedness
of the face is destituteness. To recognize the Other is to
recognize a hunger. To recognize the Other is to give. But
it is to give to the master, to the lord, to whom one ap-
proaches as “You” in a dimension of height.117
For Levinas, the epiphany of the Other evokes a command: “you
shall not commit murder”.118  It is the first ethical injunction as soon as the
self encounters the Other. Levinas claims that the ego cannot assimilate,
absorb and comprehend the Other in the same way it negates the non-
human other.119  The ego can only negate the non-human other partially;
otherwise, it cannot enjoy what it assimilates completely.120  The ego can-
not totally absorb the nonhuman other. It partially preserves and neutral-
izes the otherness of the nonhuman other in order to absorb it. In the case
of the human Other, it is the only being that the ego can kill because it
resists total annihilation or negation.121  Though by reducing the Other to
the Same, the Other may be murdered and the command defied, but
before this horrible act can be done, the Other already orders the prohibi-
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tion of murder. Murder, to Levinas’s mind, is the self’s refusal to recognize
and respect the radical alterity of the Other. It is the utter disregard of the
Other’s paralyzing power over the self’s power to annihilate. As Levinas
explains:
To kill is not to dominate but to annihilate; it is to
renounce comprehension absolutely. Murder exercises a
power over what escapes power. . . . I can wish to kill
only an existent which is absolutely independent, which
exceeds my powers infinitely and therefore does not op-
pose them but paralyses the very power of power.  The
Other is the sole being I can wish to kill.122
The very reason why the Other cannot be contained or integrated
into the Same is that only the Other is the being whom the Same wants to
kill.  The Same cannot murder a being which easily succumbs to its wishes.
But the Other, as infinitely transcendent and infinitely foreign and one whom
the Same wishes to kill, cannot be annihilated by the murderous power of
the self because it exceeds its powers infinitely.123
The Other opposes and disarms the ego of his freedom, power
and imperialism. As naked and destitute, the Other poses a defiant stand
against the ego’s sovereignty not with violent force but by its frailty. Levinas
describes it as a “resistance of what has no resistance__the ethical resis-
tance”.124  It is a force of infinite transcendence “stronger than murder”
and “convinces even ‘the people who do not wish to listen’”.125  To op-
pose power with power is to subscribe either to the Hobbessian state of
nature wherein man is at war with other men, the Hegelian dialectics of
master and slave relation where there is a struggle for recognition,  or the
Sartrean notion of Being-for-itself which culminates in absolute power,
freedom and reason. In these three philosophies, the Other is viewed as a
threat to the ego’s existence. When seen within the Levinasian ethical
project, these three philosophies is “ethically dangerous” because it re-
duces the primordial ethical relation to that of struggle and war instead of
welcome and peace.126  In Totality and Infinity, Levinas says: “The whole
of this work aims to show a relation with the other not only cutting across
the logic of contradiction, where the other of A is the non-A, the negation
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of A, but also across dialectical logic [Hegel], where the same dialectically
participates in and is reconciled with the Other in the Unity of the sys-
tem”.127  Furthermore, the Other’s resistance is not only nonviolent but it
also calls the ego to responsibility and invests it with freedom. It does not
limit the freedom of the self because his freedom has not yet emerged.
Instead it promotes his freedom by arousing its goodness.128  As Levinas
says, the “absolutely other__the Other__does not limit the freedom of the
same; calling it to responsibility, it founds it and justifies it”.129
Election and Passivity. Levinas contends that the self’s respon-
sibility to and for the Other is already established prior to the self’s exist-
ence. The responsibility is already assigned before the self is born. The
responsibility for the Other does not only precede one’s birth but also
one’s freedom and commitment. This is so because freedom “already
presupposes a theoretical consciousness, as a possibility to assume, be-
fore or after the event, a taking up that goes beyond the susceptiveness of
passivity”.130  For Levinas, responsibility is placed on one’s shoulder from
an immemorial past, “a past more ancient than every origin, a pre-original
and anarchical past” and “a past more ancient than any present, a past
which was never present”.131  This responsibility from an anarchical past
is already assigned to the self in creation. The self is already created as an
ethical being and its subjectivity is precisely this responsibility for the Other.
Levinas says: “The miracle of creation lies in creating a moral being”.132
The subject was not created and then was given freedom in order to
decide whether it should assume responsibility for the Other or not. Rather,
its very subjectivity is its subjection to the other.  Being a creature, the self
is “more passive than the passivity of matter” in the sense that it bears
responsibility for the Other from nothingness “before hearing the order”.133
Passivity implies the vulnerability of the self to the Other to the point of
being accused, traumatized and persecuted. This means then that the self
is not the cause and origin of responsibility. Moreover, passivity also con-
notes that the self has “nothing at its disposal that would enable it to not
yield to the provocation” and appeal of the Other.134  The self is already
singled out prior to its encounter with and even what is legally due to the
Other.135  Peperzak has this to say about Levinas’s passivity of the sub-
ject:
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This passivity without choice can only be thought of
as patience and pain or suffering, for otherwise__as
enjoyer__I would myself still be the focus and neither
handed over nor dedicated to the other. My suffering must
even be__at least partially__meaningless. For were I able
to grasp its meaning, I would be able to integrate it into
my consciousness in the form of some piece of knowl-
edge.136
Passivity implies accusation. The obligation imposed by the Other
on the self makes the self guilty. It is as if the self owes the Other a debt
without really incurring it.  But this debt actually has its roots in the self's
dependence on the Other. Since the Other defines the subjectivity of the
self as a “being-uniquely-responsible for the Other”, it then follows that
the self is indebted to the Other.137  “My relation to the Other”, James
Richard Mensch poignantly describes, “individualizes me”.138  Moreover,
the responsibility of the self to the Other increases to the measure in which
the self fulfills this obligation.  The self cannot really pay off the burden of
its guilt.  More is demanded of him than what he can accomplish. This is
an accusation which the self does not deserve. This unearned accusation
Levinas calls persecution. The self is persecuted against his will. He is one
who lives for the Other and has no complete possession of his own life. All
these can be summed up as substitution. In substitution, the self is totally
responsible for the other, not only for the other’s misery but also for his
crimes-even for the outrage that the other initiates against the suffering
subject.139
Levinas describes the passivity of the self to the Other as mater-
nity. “Maternity in the complete being “for the other” which characterizes
it . . . is the ultimate sense of this vulnerability”.140  This best describes the
way the self bears and serves the Other. Like a mother, the self carries the
Other without thought of reward or reciprocity. It is purely giving, nour-
ishing and sacrificing. The self nurtures the Other in the same way that a
mother selflessly takes care of her child.
According to Levinas, the Other is ‘the first one on the scene’ and
he orders the self even before the self recognizes him.141  Prior to the self's
awareness of the Other, responsibility for the Other is already firmly insti-
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tuted as if the self is obsessed, persecuted, wounded, and accused by the
Other. The Other already provokes and inflicts the self with responsibility
before the self can respond either by acceptance or refusal.  The self is
singled out to serve the Other and he is irreplaceable in his obligation to
the Other. It cannot renounce its irreplaceable responsibility because to
do so would mean giving up its own being.142  Its own being, it must be
noted, is a result of its responsiveness to alterity. He is exposed and vul-
nerable to the Other’s call for help.  In a very touching expression, Levinas
says:
In the exposure to wounds and outrages, in the feel-
ing proper to responsibility, the oneself is provoked as
irreplaceable, as devoted to the others, without being able
to resign, and thus incarnated in order to offer itself, to
suffer and to give.  It is thus one and unique, in passivity
from the start, having nothing at its disposal that would
enable it to not yield to the provocation. It is one, re-
duced to itself and as it were contracted, expelled into
itself outside of being. The exile or refuge in itself is with-
out conditions and support, far from the abundant covers
and excuses which the essence exhibited in the said of-
fers. In responsibility as one assigned or elected from the
outside, assigned as irreplaceable, the subject is accused
in its skin, too tight for its skin.143
This responsibility placed on the shoulder of the self before its
birth is what Levinas calls “unjustifiable election”. The self is chosen to
take care of the Other, the reason of which is oblivious to the self, except
that the self’s “election is in the subjection.144  Election refers to the self’s
unforeseeable and singular or unique obligation to the Other.145  It is the
‘Good’, Levinas says, that elects the self to serve the Other.
The Good cannot become present or enter into a rep-
resentation. The present is a beginning in my freedom,
whereas the Good is not presented to freedom; it has
chosen me before I have chosen it. No one is good vol-
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untarily. We can see the formal structure of nonfreedom
in a subjectivity which does not have time to choose the
Good and thus is penetrated with its rays unbeknownst to
itself. But subjectivity sees this freedom redeemed, ex-
ceptionally, by the goodness of the Good. The exception
is unique. And if no one is good voluntarily, no one is
enslaved to the Good.146
For Levinas, election is not a privilege but “the fundamental char-
acteristic of the human person as morally responsible. Responsibility . . . is
a principle of individuation”.147  It is not the Heideggerian anxiety over
one’s death that singularizes the self but its assumption of responsibility
instigated  by the face of the Other. Being already chosen to be respon-
sible for the Other before one’s birth signifies not prestige but responsibil-
ity. The self must take up this challenge that gives worth and dignity to his
being.
Subjectivity and Substitution. For Levinas, the subjectivity of
the subject is its subjection to the Other. The self is one-for-the Other,
built and structured to respond to another human being.  This is what is
precisely meant by the self's radical passivity to the Other. Once the Other
appears on the scene, the self is immediately responsible and no one can
take his place.  Right there and then, the self is summoned to responsibility
even to the point of substituting for the Other. Levinas writes: “I can sub-
stitute myself for everyone, but no one can substitute himself for me. Such
is my inalienable identity of subject”.148  The self's irreplaceable substitu-
tion for the Other, its being accused by the Other is what, according to
Levinas, makes the self unique.149  This excessive responsibility of the self
for the Other, however, does not negate the identity of the self. It is not “a
flight into the void, but a movement into fullness” which establishes the
subjectivity, identity and unicity of the self.150  As Levinas explains:
It is, however, not an alienation, because the other in
the same is my substitution of the other through responsi-
bility, for which I am summoned as someone irreplace-
able. I exist through the other and for the other, but with-
out this being alienation: I am inspired.151
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Subjectivity for Levinas is not primarily consciousness. The “ap-
pearance of being is not the ultimate legitimization of subjectivity”.152  As
Jeffrey Kosky says, “The subject is not, finally, reducible to the field or the
event wherein beings are deployed in their being.153  Levinas remarks,
“consciousness, knowing of the self by the self [savoir de soi par soi], is
not all there is to the notion of subjectivity.  It already rests on a ‘sub-
jected’ condition” which is “the very sub-jection of the subject . . . ob-
sessed with responsibility for the oppressed”.154  Levinas rejects Descartes’
central claim “I think, therefore I am” and replaces it with an accusative
statement “Here I am”.155  The latter expression signifies an unconditional
offering of oneself to another. This means that the self as sensibility already
encounters and is already affected by the other at the level of sensibility
before the other becomes an object of consciousness.156  As Critchley
says, “The ethical relation takes place at the level of sensibility, not at the
level of consciousness.  The Levinasian ethical subject is a sensible sub-
ject, not a conscious subject”.157  In fact, subjectivity is the Other in the
Same. “The other in the same determinative of subjectivity is the restless-
ness of the same disturbed by the other”.158  Furthermore, this subjectivity
is a condition of being hostage to the Other.159  The self as hostage does
not only mean that the self must answer the call and satisfy the hunger of
the Other but it also implies that the self is responsible for the behavior and
misdeeds of the Other, including those acts that persecute other persons
including the self.160  According to Michele Saracino,
The term hostage is a powerful image for Jews and
Christians alike, for one cannot help but think of the mo-
ments in which Abraham’s son, Isaac, and God’s son,
Jesus, are held hostage for others. Importantly, these situ-
ations are not ones of simple exchange. It is . . . sacrifice
. . . beyond a symmetrical substitution or equal trade.161
To be hostage to the Other is a deposition that draws the self out
of its home to meet and welcome the Other even to the point of offering
his comfort and life.162  The real meaning of subjectivity is subjection to
the other.163  Subjectivity is synonymous to responsibility.  Such responsi-
bility is non-reciprocal or assymetrical. The self cannot demand from the
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other the same responsibility he gives to him.  As such, responsibility is
disinterested and non-transferable. No one can take the place of the self’s
responsibility for the Other.164  The subject, before it can form an image of
the Other, is already affected and shocked by the Other’s presence. The
outward movement of its consciousness in order to apprehend and pos-
sess the exterior is reverted by the Other. Before the ego can exercise its
sovereign will, it is already persecuted by the Other.165  For Levinas, “The
other individuates me in the responsibility I have for him”.166  This varies
from Heidegger’s notion of subjectivity because it is death that individu-
ates Dasein.
The self’s responsibility for the Other does not happen by chance;
rather, it is placed in the subject and takes the form of an accusation.
Levinas says, “I have not done anything and I have always been under
accusation__persecuted”.167  The self does not know the reason why, ex-
cept that from the very beginning he is already de-posed from his home as
a subject. “It is a withdrawal in-oneself which is an exile in oneself, with-
out a foundation in anything else, a non-condition. The withdrawal ex-
cludes all spontaneity, and is thus always already effected, already past”.168
For Levinas, the form that the subject’s subjection to the Other
assumes is that of sensibility or sentience. This sensibility is a vulnerability
and passivity towards the Other.   Sensibility is proximity to the Other and
it is the foundation of intentionality.169  Hence, for Levinas the self is an
embodied subject capable of being affected and vulnerable to the needs
and sufferings of the Other. As Critchley describes: “The ethical subject is
an embodied being of flesh and blood, a being that is capable of hunger,
who eats and who enjoys eating”.170  For Levinas, responsibility is con-
crete.  The self is incarnated so that it can support the material needs of
the other. The self in hypostasis builds a home in order to welcome and
play host to the stranger who knocks at the door. As Levinas explains,
sensibility
has meaning only as a “taking care of the other’s need”,
of his misfortunes and his faults, that is, as a giving. But
giving has meaning only as a tearing from oneself despite
oneself, and not only without me. And to be torn from
oneself despite oneself has meaning only as a being torn
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from complacency in oneself characteristic of enjoyment,
snatching the bread from one’s mouth. Only a subject
that eats can be for-the-other, or can signify.171
The intimate relation between the self and Other is what Levinas
calls proximity. Levinas describes proximity in the following way:
Proximity is thus anarchically a relationship with a
singularity without the mediation of any principle, any ide-
ality. . . . The relationship of proximity cannot be reduced
to any modality of distance or geometrical contiguity, nor
to the simple “representation” of a neighbor; it is already
an assignation, an extremely urgent assignation__an obli-
gation, anachronously prior to any commitment. . . . This
formula expresses a way of being affected without the
source of affection becoming a theme of representation.
We have called this relationship irreducible to conscious-
ness obsession.172
In other words, proximity, although it puts into contact the self
and the Other, does not reduce the contact into a union where the inde-
pendence or separation of both is annihilated. It is a difference which is
“non-indifference”.173  This explains why Levinas calls the Other as the
stranger because he is outside of the ego’s intentional grasp and a neigh-
bor because he touches the very sensibility of the self.
One’s responsibility for the Other, according to Levinas, is not
motivated by a debt the former owes to the latter. Such a motivation
manifests the ego’s need to persist in his being. The motivation is not
intrinsic but extrinsic to the self although the Other as the infinite is already
in the finite self.174  What the Other does is that it awakens the self to its
responsibility. But this awakening is “produced concretely in the form of
an irresistible call to responsibility”.175  This concrete responsibility means
“To give, to-be-for-another, despite oneself, but in interrupting the for-
oneself, is to take the bread out of one’s mouth, to nourish the hunger of
another with one’s own fasting”.176
As already noted above, Levinas says that the infinite is already
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contained in a thought that exceeds and cannot contain it. The prefix “in”
of infinite both signifies that the infinite is inside the finite self as well as
outside of it.177  How is this possible? The infinite is already in the finite
because, as already explained, somebody from an immemorial past placed
it there. The self is already made responsible to Other prior to its creation
or birth.  The infinite is at the same time outside of the finite self because
the self is not the reason or the cause of the infinite Other’s existence. The
infinite Other is in fact the reason for the finite self's being. It must be
remembered that the subjectivity of the subject is its subjection to the
Other. It is the Other that constitutes the very subjectivity of the self, a
subjectivity that is “a passivity more passive than all passivity”. Thus, the
self is passive and vulnerable to the disturbance of the Other. This passiv-
ity and vulnerability, however, is not tranquility because it is a passivity and
vulnerability of a hostage.178
The self’s responsibility to the Other, just like desire, is infinite and
insatiable. It is infinite because the more the ego responds to the Other,
the more the responsibility deepens. As Levinas says, “The debt increases
in the measures that it is paid”.179  Levinas quotes Dostoyevsky in The
Brothers Karamazov to stress this point: “Each of us is guilty before
everyone, for everyone and for everything, and I more than the others”.180
For Levinas the relation between the self and the Other is not
reciprocal but asymmetrical.  The self’s responsibilities to the Other is not
equal to the responsibilities of the Other to the Same. To construe the
relation as reciprocal would place both in the same category or genus
which implies a totality.  Reciprocity is equality and this makes both sides
of the equation identical. Such identity is not ethical but ontological. The
asymmetrical relation between the self and the Other is due to the self's
irreplaceable substitution (or unicity) for the Other. The self can substitute
for the Other but no one can substitute him in his responsibility for the
Other. The self alone bears this responsibility upon himself and cannot
place this burden on others.  The self's responsibility is unique and non-
transferable. For this reason, Levinas argued that responsibility is exces-
sive, infinite and irreplaceable. As such, the responsible self cannot de-
mand the same amount of responsibility from the Other. To do so, Levinas
says, “would be to preach human sacrifice” and it is “criminal”.181  One’s
responsibility cannot be universalized (as in Kant) otherwise the respon-
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sible self would just be something abstract and not a concrete one. The
responsible subject is “me”, unique and particularly elected to respond
the approach of the Other.
The Other’s destitution makes the self question its own existence
as regards his contribution to the Other’s misery even if the self is not
directly and consciously involved. This shows how powerful the Other is
despite his weakness. In the face of the Other, the self’s freedom is ques-
tioned and he is summoned to surrender it in order to preserve it. But this
relinquishment of freedom is not in line with Hobbes’ (and, to a certain
extent, Hegel’s) conception where individual freedom is subordinated to
the State. Such a renunciation is self-serving because one gives up one’s
liberty in order to have peace and consequently preserve one’s being.  As
Peperzak explains:
The incentive to peace remains selfish-striving toward
a secure life in mutual exchange with other humans. The
self-interested repression of violence secures rational co-
herence and association. Reason and politics fight every
possible anarchy.182
Levinas thinks that this notion of freedom subordinated to the
ideals of the State is bound to create trouble and violence because it is not
grounded on a selfless or disinterested ethical relation. For him, freedom
is given up not to the abstract goals of the State but to the Other who is
concrete. In this sense, the freedom of the self is not dissolved into a blind
acquiescence to an anonymous power as in Heidegger, which is still a
vestige of ontology.
Language and Proximity. The ethical relation between the self
and the Other is not a perceptual or visual encounter. Instead, it is a lin-
guistic event.182  The Other who discloses himself as the face Levinas
designates as “primordial expression” or language whose first word is
“you shall not commit murder”.184  The face is not something that the self
sees but someone to whom it speaks.  This close encounter and contact
between the self and the Other through language, Levinas names proxim-
ity. Proximity is the pre-original approach of the Other that establishes
non-cognitive and non-spatial intimacy of the self with the Other.  It is
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non-cognitive because the ethical encounter takes place at the level of
sense and affective experience. It is also non-spatial because it preserves
the distance between the two. Otherwise, this relation is reduced into a
unity or synthesis which constitutes a totality.
 The face as expression or language is a signification that signifies
an ethical command. His presence speaks the language of an ethical ap-
peal, of prayer or supplication.185  The Other beseeches the self to recog-
nize and respect him. This in turn instigates the self to express the language
of greeting, a “hello” which signifies a blessing and availability.186  The self
is beckoned to offer himself and say “Here I am”. Through language, the
Other opens and offers himself to the self. The Other who approaches
communicates to the self and this touches the self’s sensibility. In lan-
guage, the self finds that it cannot assimilate the Other in its world. The self
discovers through language that he does not inhabit the world alone and
that there are others who also share this world with him. Language is the
place where different worlds come together. Hence, it becomes the birth-
place as well as the matrix of the ethical relation. For Levinas, language
“announces the ethical inviolability of the Other”.187  Its essence is hospi-
tality and goodness.188  As an ethical event, language welcomes the Other.
The following lines from Totality and Infinity best capture this notion of
language as ethical and therefore communal:
Language is universal because it is the very passage
from the individual to the general, because it offers things
which are mine to the other. To speak is to make the
world common, to create commonplaces.  Language does
not refer to the generality of concepts, but lays the foun-
dations for a possession in common. It abolishes the in-
alienable property of enjoyment. The world in discourse
is no longer what is in separation, in the being at home
with oneself where everything is given to me; it is what I
give: the communicable, the thought, the universal.189
When Levinas claims that the face is language and speech, the
kind of language he refers to is the primordial expression he calls Saying.
This is non-thematizing and non-violent language prior to conceptualization
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and philosophizing. Conceptual and discursive language Levinas calls the
Said.  It is the language that dominates Western philosophy. Hence, lan-
guage “as saying is an ethical openness to the other; as that which is
said__reduced to a fixed identity or synchronized presence__it is an onto-
logical closure to the other”.190
In language, the one who is usually given attention is the subject
who speaks and the content of his words, the Said. The Other, the person
spoken to, takes secondary importance.  Moreover, “In the realm of the
said, the speaker assigns meanings to objects and ideas”.191  This is a
process which identifies, names, or labels things. Levinas challenges this
view of language by reversing it so as to emphasize the Other. For him
language does not only disclose being or represent things, but it also solic-
its concern.192  “The activity of speaking robs the subject of its central
position; it is the depositing of a subject without refuge. The speaking
subject is no longer by and for itself; it is for the other”.193
Levinas insists that the Said should be referred back to the Say-
ing; otherwise the self would overlook its “essential exposure to the Other
without which there would be neither utterance nor meaning”.194  He says:
Antecedent to the verbal signs it conjugates, to the
linguistic systems and semantic glimmerings, a foreword
preceding languages, it [saying] is the proximity of one to
the other, the commitment of an approach, the one for the
other, the very signifyingness of signification.195
For Levinas, the Saying is what conditions the possibility of the
Said.196  It is Saying which exposes the self “to the Other as a speaker or
receiver of discourse”.197  It is the site where contact with the Other takes
place because it “uncovers the one that speaks, not as an object disclosed
by theory, but in the sense that one discloses oneself by neglecting one’s
defenses, leaving a shelter, exposing oneself to outrage, to insults and
wounding”.198  Moreover, Saying does not only expose the self to the
Other but it also assigns the former to the latter. Saying is an assignation,
an encounter, where the self is separated from its inwardness and is ex-
posed towards the Other. Thus, the self is de-posed or de-situated from
its interiority because “the saying tears the ego from its lair”.199
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The Said, on the other hand, thematizes Saying.  It is the verbal-
ization of Being, which is the realm of ontology.200  The Said, according to
Levinas, betrays Saying because it transforms the ethical contact of the
self with the Other into a theme or object of knowledge.201  Once the
ethical relation becomes an object of thought, the Other is no longer treated
as absolute alterity and this denies the justice and respect due to him. For
Levinas, the Said could not exhaust the meaning of Saying. Saying always
overflows the Said. And yet, Levinas argues, it is only through the Said
that one can have access to and express Saying.202  Thus the Said is
indispensable since without it there would be no philosophy.203  Also,
without the Said, no society, justice, judgment or moral norms would be
possible.204
The Saying and the Said occur at different temporal levels. The
realm of the Saying is diachronic time where the self encounters the Other
prior to its synchronizing and thematizing vision. Diachronic time is the
realm of transcendence and infinity. It is time outside of Husserlian phe-
nomenology where the past is gathered into the simultaneity of the present
by retention (or memory) and the future by protention (or hope).  Most
importantly, it is also the time where the self as passivity and sensibility is
opened to the ethical supplication demanded by the face of the Other.
Happening in a different temporal plane, is the realm of the Said.
This realm is synchronic time where the Other is represented as a theme in
the mind of the ego. Here, the Other loses its singularity or uniqueness
because it is reduced into a general concept.  Synchronic time is the realm
of totality and immanence. It is the time of Being where beings or entities
become manifest and where they are gathered together by a synthetic
vision (of retention or protention) that reduces them to concepts and themes
or a Said.
The importance of the distinction Levinas makes between Saying
and the Said could be seen in the issue that Derrida raises in his essay
Violence and Metaphysics205 against Levinas’s reliance on ontological
language to propound an ethical metaphysics.206  Derrida points to the
contradiction implicit in Levinas’s thought because in describing the Other
as Infinite, for example, Levinas makes use of inherited philosophical lan-
guage.207  Simmons succinctly explains it this way:
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Levinas who desires to replace ontology with ethics,
relies, at least in Totality and Infinity, on terms which
are permeated with ontological connotations such as ‘be-
ing’, ‘truth’, ‘objectivity’, and ‘in-finite’. In other words,
Levinas cannot transcend the philosophical tradition be-
cause he is using its language.208
This language does violence to the Other because it assimilates
alterity into the ego. “Since language is thematizing, violent, and appro-
priative, our first encounter with the Other will be thematizing, violent and
appropriative. Thus, the first relationship is not ethical”.209
In other words, Levinas cannot escape the very language he at-
tempts to overcome.  If the Other is unthematizable and oblivious to thought,
then philosophical language is impossible. But Levinas answers that the
original approach of the Other is a Saying which, when stated in proposi-
tions (Said), betrays the ethical encounter. The ethical encounter happens
in a diachronic time where the self strongly feels the weight of the Other’s
ethical plea. Although the Said is indispensable because it is necessary for
order, law and justice, the Saying must be preserved because it is the
heart of ethical relations. There should be a constant unsaying or
deconstruction of the Said in order to allow the Saying to “circulate as
residue or interruption within the said” and avoid the complete reduction
of the otherwise than Being to ontological language.210  This movement
from the Said to the Saying, which should be the task of ethics as first
philosophy, point to a beginning where the subject, prior to the birth of his
consciousness as well as his freedom, is exposed to the Other, capable of
being affected by and therefore respond to the Other’s ethical appeal.211
As Levinas would say: “saying is to be responsible for others”.212
The Heideggerian play of unconcealment and concealment is a
dialectic that still belongs to ontology (or Being) and hence, of synchronic
time.  In order to break away from this dialectics of perpetual uncovering
of the Unsaid from the Said, Levinas redirects philosophical questioning
from repeatable time to an immemorial time of the Saying where the Said
is constantly examined and re-examined so as to bear witness to the infi-
nite and transcendence.
Skepticism. At this point it is significant to introduce the role skep-
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ticism plays in the philosophy of Levinas.  Skepticism, according to Levinas,
is philosophy’s “legitimate child”.213  The history of Western philosophy
has shown that skepticism periodically recurs and this, according to Levinas,
indicates that philosophy cannot exhaust the truth about everything. Levinas
says:
Philosophy is not separable from skepticism, which
follows it like a shadow it drives off by refuting it again at
once on its footsteps. Does not the last word belong to
philosophy? Yes, in a certain sense, since for western phi-
losophy the saying is exhausted in this said. But skepti-
cism in fact makes a difference, and puts an interval be-
tween saying and the said. Skepticism is refutable but it
returns.214
Indeed, skepticism cannot escape its contradictory assertion but
it performs an important role by constantly reminding philosophy of its
ethical origin and task which is to continually unsay what has been said. It
redirects philosophy to a transcendent (diachronic) time where alterity
and infinity is otherwise than Being. As Levinas says: “Skepticism, which
traverses the rationality or logic of knowledge, is a refusal to synchronize
the implicit affirmation contained in saying and the negation which this
affirmation states in the said”.215
The skeptic’s claim that truth is not possible is refuted at the level
of logic and rationality because the assertion implies that it is not possible
that truth is not possible. But it is precisely this sphere of thought which
skepticism attacks and this spares skepticism from the refutation. The
contradictory remarks of skepticism are only contradictory in the realm of
the logical Said but not so in the skeptical Saying.216  The periodic recur-
rence of skepticism in the history of Western thought, according to Levinas,
would just be “pure nonsense” if its critique of the Said is to be refuted
under the auspices of logical thought since skepticism inhabits in and judges
from the realm of the Saying.217  The approach of the other as Saying
cannot be totally congealed in a Said for the Other continually recedes
from synchrony and thematization.
Levinas is not saying that the skeptic’s claim is true.  What he
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means, according to Peperzak, is that the
‘truth’ that attempts to pronounce itself in skepticism is
rather the necessity…of recalling (deèdire) the Said, and
of replacing it by a new Saying (redire) that is just as little
a final Saying as the previous one was. The enigma of
transcendence, which can never become evident, does
not come into its own by synoptic expositions in which
time stands still but only by continual attempts through
new speeches to rectify the unavoidable contradictions of
speaking.218
The Third Party. For Levinas, the ethical or face to face relation
is not merely a private or exclusive affair between the self and the Other.219
The face as expression and as language opens up to the rest of humanity
which Levinas calls the third party.220  The third party is the neighbor of
the self’s neighbor and represents every person. He is the neighbor of
every Other.
The third party is other than the neighbor, but also
another neighbor, and also a neighbor of the other, and
not simply his fellow. . . . The other stands in a relation-
ship with the third party, for whom I cannot entirely an-
swer, even if I alone answer, before any question, for my
neighbor. The other and the third party, my neighbors,
contemporaries of one another, put distance between me
and the other and the third party. . . . It [third party] is of
itself the limit of responsibility and the birth of the ques-
tion: What do I have to do with justice? A question of
consciousness. Justice is necessary, that is, comparison,
co-existence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order,
thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality
and the intellect, and in the intentionality and intellect, the
intelligibility of a system and thence also a copresence on
an equal footing as before a court of justice.221
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The emergence of the third party which is revealed in the face of
the Other disturbs the intimacy and asymmetrical relationship between the
self and the Other. This is so because the third party demands for justice.
The neighbor and the third party simultaneously call to and demand for
responsibility from the Other. It is the third party which prompts the self to
weigh, evaluate, compare, calculate and think which for him needs most
his attention and service. The arrival of the third party is the inception of
justice, symmetry, philosophy and law. It is the third party that divides the
attention of the self. If there were only the self and the neighbor, then there
would have been no problem, for in this situation the self has undivided
attention for the Other. But the surfacing of the third party limits the self’s
unbounded care for the Other and poses problems as regards priority as
well as the nature of relationship between the Other and the third party.
Because of the third, the self now becomes a judge for he must
compare, calculate, correct, order and treat others as equals.  This now
necessitates the rational organization of society and the creation of laws in
order to carry out justice. The entry of the third legitimizes the state, poli-
tics and philosophy.  It corrects the asymmetry in the relation of the self
and the Other.  It also upholds the welfare of the self because his respon-
sibility is no longer solely for others but also for himself since he is also a
neighbor to others.222
To be sure . . . my responsibility for all can and has to
manifest itself also in limiting itself. The ego can, in the
name of this unlimited responsibility, be called upon to
concern itself also with itself. The fact that the other, my
neighbor, is also a third party with respect to another,
who is also a neighbor, is the birth of thought, conscious-
ness, justice and philosophy.223
Conclusion: Ethics as Beyond Nature or Ontology and Towards
God
This final section will discuss the movement of the ethical relation
between the Same and the Other towards transcendence. Levinas names
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this ethical bond religion.224  Religion presupposes an ethics that points in
the direction of God. It is an ethical proximity that manifests God’s pres-
ence. In this proximity, God leaves only a trace which cannot be traced at
all since it redirects the self to his responsibility to the Other. “Divinity”,
William Paul Simmons writes, “is experienced through the trace”.225
Levinas asserts that “the dimension of the Divine opens forth from
the human face”.226  He says that “the Other is not the incarnation of God,
but precisely by his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of
the height in which God is revealed”.227  God therefore is revealed in the
human face as the Good beyond Being and yet the human face is not
God’s embodiment. “The alterity of the face ‘points’ to God’s transcen-
dence, but without being its incarnation, symbol, or self-expression”.228
God instead leaves a trace in the face of the other person whose face
summons the self to responsibility. What Levinas is saying is that ethics
provides an opening towards the Divine because the Other “resembles
God” and he is “closer to God than I”.229  Ethics, in the words of Cohen
as he interprets Levinas, is the “authentic entry” to God.230  It leads to a
vision of God because “responsibility”, as Kosky elucidates, “would be
the image of God in man”.231  But this vision is “without image, bereft of
the synoptic and totalizing objectifying virtues of vision, a relation of inten-
tionality of wholly different type”.232  This “relation of intentionality of a
wholly different type” is not the Husserlian noesis-noematic correlation,
but the intentionality of desire inflamed by the ethical appeal of the Other.
For Levinas, God is only accessible through responsibility for the
Other. God as Infinite is refractory to human thought. He cannot become
an object of conscious representation. As Levinas remarks: “There is wit-
ness . . . only of the Infinite. The infinite does not appear to him that bears
witness to it. On the contrary, the witness belongs to the glory of the
Infinite. It is by the voice of the witness that the glory of the Infinite is
glorified”.233  For Levinas, the self who is addressed by the Other through
his ethical appeal bears witness to Divine transcendence. The self’s re-
sponsibility to the Other is the living testimony of God’s presence. As
Wyschogrod says, “The one who, in self-giving, says to the Other, ‘Here
I am’, placing the self at another’s disposal, bears witness to the Infi-
nite.234
Levinas employs the word illeity or he-ness to name this incom-
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prehensible God. God is designated as this third person demonstrative
pronoun in order to preserve his transcendence as well as to show re-
spect to Him.  Illeity “designates something present but at a distance,
such as ‘that great man over there’ or anything to which one refers with
respect”.235  For Levinas then, images or concepts of God arrived at
through intellectual vision or proof would be artificial since they reduce
God’s transcendence to immanence. God’s withdrawal from the clutches
of man’s intellectual grasp is instead God’s way of redirecting man’s gaze
to the Other. As Levinas explains: “A God invisible means not only a God
unimaginable, but a God accessible in justice.  Ethics is the spiritual optics.
The other is the very locus of metaphysical truth, and is indispensable for
my relation with God”.236
In saying that ethics enables the self to bear testimony to the pres-
ence of God through its infinite responsibility to the Other, Levinas does
not imply “that religion is reducible to ethical intersubjectivity . . . but
rather that intersubjectivity is raised to religion, that is to say, raised above
its own ontological possibilities”.237  This means that God is neither iden-
tical with the ethical relation, nor is He the being or the foundation of this
relation. Ethics is rather a spiritual optics, an optics of the Divine. It makes
visible the invisible, reveals the infinite in the finite and manifests transcen-
dence without incarnation. Though the ethical is the space through which
God reveals, the face of the Other does not function as a mediator be-
tween the self and God. God remains transcendent and wholly Other. He
is other than and outside of Being.  To construe God as someone who
dwells in the Other is an infringement of his illeity.
For Levinas, ethics is not only first philosophy. He also considers
it as “first theology”.238  Theology, according to Michael Purcell, “is both
ethical in content and ethical in origin”.239  The realm of the ethical face to
face is the condition that makes theology receptive to revelation.  Dis-
course about God and His revelation, Purcell says, “can have no other
point of departure than in the subject who is capable of asking the ques-
tion about God, or the subject for whom God can become a possible
question”.240  Morever, “the question of God cannot be asked without
raising the prior question of the one who is able to ask the question of
God. Theology begins as theological anthropology; and to reflect on the
human person is already to be involved in an ethical enterprise.241
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Levinas has already pointed out that human subjectivity is respon-
sibility and deference to the Other. It is a subjectivity constituted not by a
satisfaction of a natural need but by a metaphysical or spiritual desire.
Man’s basic structure is not merely a conatus, a perseverance in being
but an inescapable love for the Other. Levinas says: “The metaphysical
desire has another intention; it desires beyond everything that can com-
plete it.  It is like goodness__the Desired does not fulfill it, but deepens
it”.242  This metaphysical desire is an eschatology which is a “relationship
with a surplus always exterior to the totality”.243  Wyschogrod explains the
transition from the natural life to the religious life in Levinas thought in this
way:
Once need is established phenomenologically as be-
longing to natural man, Levinas has prepared the ground
for homo religiosus, who remains man as need but who
cannot fulfill his need in natural existence. It is the need for
transcendence that characterizes fully human ethical ex-
istence. This transcendence . . . is founded in the experi-
ence of other persons.244
For Levinas, the true life “is not a conatus but disinterestedness
and adieu”.245  It is a life of selfless giving to others motivated by a desire
for God. Levinas asserts that his ethical philosophy is not purely of this
world in the sense that it seeks to transcend the natural tendency of the
ego to persevere in its being. “Ethics is, therefore, against nature be-
cause it forbids the murderousness of my natural will to put my own exist-
ence first”.  For Levinas ethics is rooted neither in being nor in Being but in
a Platonic “Good beyond Being”.  As he nicely puts it:
The ethical situation is a human situation, beyond hu-
man nature, in which the idea of God comes to mind (Gott
fallt mir ein). In this respect, we could say that God is
the other who turns our nature inside out, who calls our
ontological will-to-be in question.  This ethical call of con-
science occurs, no doubt, in other religious systems be-
sides the Judeo-Christian, but it remains an essentially
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religious vocation. God does indeed go against nature,
for He is not of this world.  God is other than being.247
From these eloquent words, Levinas seems to imply that ethics
points to man’s fundamental relation to God as evidenced by his desire
that is inflamed by the Other.  Man’s inescapable primordial ethical rela-
tion with the Other, this “obsession of responsibility is, in a sense, the
“latent birth” of religion”.248  Subjectivity as desire is intentionality. It seeks
transcendence and it takes the form of responsibility for the infinite Other.
This structure of subjectivity as transcendence points to the religious ori-
entation of human existence. Levinas puts it succinctly in the following
words: “The impossibility of escaping God lies in the depths of myself as a
self, as an absolute passivity.249
Endnotes
1The title of this article is a phrase borrowed from Emmanuel Levinas. See
his Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Sean Hand (Baltimore, Maryland:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 159. There is a similar expression in his
Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1969), 78. Levinas says: “Ethics is the spiritual optics”.
2With Levinas’s approval, Lingis translates the French word autrui as the
“personal Other, the you” while autre as simply “other”. See footnote of page 24 in
Totality and Infinity.
3Emmanuel Levinas, “The Paradox of Morality”, “translated by A. Ben-
jamin and T. Wright in R. Bernasconi and D. Woods, editors, The Provocation of
Levinas (London: Routledge, 1988 [1976]), 172. Quoted in Peter Atterton, “Emmanuel
Levinas”, in Postmodernism: The Key Figures, edited by Hans Bertens and Joseph
Natoli (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 235.
4Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 78-79.
5Adriaan Peperzak, To The Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Emmanuel Levinas (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1993), 212 &
217; Richard A. Cohen, “Foreword” to Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or
Beyond Essence, translated by Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijjhoff,
1981; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1998), xii. See also
Cohen’s “Introduction” to Emmanuel Levinas, Humanism of the Other, trans. Nidra
Poller (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003), xxvi-xxvii.
6Colin Davis, Levinas: An Introduction (Notre Dame, Indiana: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 2. See also Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearney,
128 Prajna Vihara~
“Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas”, in Richard A. Cohen, editor, Face to Face with
Levinas (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1986), 27.
7Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 26.
8Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 127.
9Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 17.
10Emmanuel Levinas, “There is: Existence without Existents”, in The Levinas
Reader, trans. Sean Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989)31.
11Richard A. Cohen, Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig
and Levinas (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 139.
12Levinas, “There is: Existence without Existents”, 30.
13Levinas, “There is: Existence without Existents”, 31
14Levinas, “There is: Existence without Existents”, 30.
15Philip N. Lawton, Jr., “Levinas’ Notion of the ‘There Is’’”, Philosophy
Today 29 (Spring 1976): 69.
16Levinas, “There is: Existence without Existents”, 30.
17Levinas, “There is: Existence without Existents”, 31.
18Levinas, “There is: Existence without Existents”, 31.
19Levinas, “There is: Existence without Existents”, 31.
20Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 131-132.
21Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 131.
22Levinas, “There is: Existence without Existents”, 31.
23Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 131.
24Davis, Levinas: An Introduction, 23.
25Davis, Levinas: An Introduction, 23. See also Edith Wyschogrod,
Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphysics, second edition (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 68.
26Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 132.
27Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 110.
28Peperzak, To the Other, 150.
29Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 36.
30Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco, On Levinas, (Belmont, California:
Thomson Wadsworth, 2005),61.
31Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 115.  Wyschogrod avers that Levinas
provides a novel insight on life in its basic form as enjoyment which runs contrary
to the existentialist view of man who in his existence is stricken by anxiety, bore-
dom, nausea, loneliness and absurdity.  She enunciates: “Levinas posits a self at
home with itself, satiable and happy.  Suffering is understood against the back-
ground of prior satiety and is experienced as destruction of satiety.  Levinas intro-
duces into contemporary existential analyses of primordial affective states a radi-
cally new understanding of being-in-the-world, a view that upholds human satis-
faction within the framework of ontological plenitude”. Wyschogrod, Emmanuel
Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphysics, 61.
32Davis, Levinas: An Introduction, 43.
129Ryan C. Urbano
33Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 149-150.
34Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 111.
35Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 112.
36Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 133.
37Wyschogrod, Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphys-
ics, 62-63.  Peperzak endorses the same judgment on the innocence of the ego as
enjoyment.  He says: “The hedonism and utilitarianism of the ‘economy’ is not an
evil, but rather the constitution of a provisional world which waits for and ‘desires’
a more properly human meaning”. Peperzak, Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel
Levinas, 122.
38Davis, Levinas; An Introduction, 43.
39Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 33.
40Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 135-136.
41Emmanuel Levinas, “The Trace of the Other”, trans. Alphonso Lingis, in
Deconstruction in Context, ed. Mark Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1986), 350.  Cited in William Paul Simmons, An-archy and Justice: An Introduction
to Emmanuel Levinas’s Political Thought (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books,
2003), 37.
42Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 33.
43Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 117.
44Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 34.
45Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 34.
46Simons, An-archy and Justice, 37.
47Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 116-117.
48Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 114.
49Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 117.
50Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 110.
51Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 135.
52Peperzak, To the Other, 150.
53Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 135.
54Simon Critchley, “Introduction”, in Simon Critchley and Robert
Bernasconi, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Levinas (Cambridge, United King-
dom: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 20.
55This is now the theme of Levinas’s second major work Otherwise than
Being or Beyond Essence. In this work Levinas reinterprets sensibility as proximity
and sensitivity to the Other. See Critchley, "Introduction," in The Cambridge Com-
panion to Levinas, 21.
56Peperzak, To the Other, 156.
57Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 117.
58Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 127.
59Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 114.
60Wyschogrod, Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphys-
ics, 65.
130 ~Prajna Vihara
61Peperzak, To the Other, 156.
62Levinas, “Time and the Other”, in The Levinas Reader, 38.
63Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 143-144.
64Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 156-157.
65Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 141.
66Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 146.
67Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 110.
68Peperzak, Beyond, 9.
69Peperzak, Beyond, 9.  See also his To the Other, 24.
70Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 158.
71Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 153.
72Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 141.
73Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 153.
74Peperzak, To the Other, 23.
75Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 183.
76Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 74.
77Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 120.
78Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 117.
79Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 148.
80Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 38.
81Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 8.  See also Totality and Infinity, 118.
82Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 38.
83Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 134.
84Edmund Husserl poses quite the same question in one of his writings.
He asked: “How can my ego, within his peculiar ownness, constitute under the
name ‘experience of something other’ precisely something other__something that
excludes the constituted from the concrete make-up of the sense-constituting ‘I-
myself’ which I ascribe to this something other as alter ego?” Husserl, Cartesian
Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, translated by Dorion Cairns
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 94. The difference between Husserl and Levinas
as regards the problem of the self and the Other is quite obvious. Levinas views the
problem as an ethical one whereas Husserl looks at it from the perspective of
epistemology.  Levinas thinks that Husserl’s way of looking at the problem (and all
those philosophers who consider the problem as primarily epistemological) jeopar-
dizes ethics in that one does not need to prove first that the Other exists before one
can be responsible for him. In other words, one does not ask oneself if the person
who needs his immediate help exists or not before he extends his assistance. This
demeanor, Levinas would perhaps think, is preposterous.
85Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 103.
86Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 75-76.
87Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 43.
88Betina Bergo, “Emmanuel Levinas” The Stanford Enclopedia of Phi-
losophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, editor; available from http://
131Ryan C. Urbano
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/levinas/.
89Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 111-112. See also Davis, Levinas: An
Introduction, 80.
90Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 111; Critchley, “Introduction”, in The
Cambridge Companion to Levinas, 15. See also Simon Critchley, The Ethics of
Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, second edition (George Square, Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 5.
91Peperzak, To the Other, 22.
92Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 39.
93Levinas, “Ethics as First Philosophy”, in The Levinas Reader, 82; 85.
Levinas, alluding to Heidegger, asks “if the Da of my Dasein is not already the
usurpation of somebody else’s place”. Levinas, “Ethics as First Philosophy”, in
The Levinas Reader, 85.
94See Emmanuel Levinas, “Enigma and Phenomenon”, in Emmanuel
Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. Adriaan Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and
Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996),
65-77.
95Levinas and Kearney, “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas”, in Face to
Face with Levinas, 24.
96Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 109.
97Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 124.
98Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 107.
99Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 108.
100Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 109.
101Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 106. See also Emmanuel Levinas, Entre
Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 202.
102Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 48.
103Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 146.
104See Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 47.
105Andrius Valeviχius, From the Other to the Totally Other: The Religious
Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), 2-3.
106Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 116.
107Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 50.
108Virginia L. Jayme, “Emmanuel Levinas’ Philosophy of Responsible Sub-
jectivity”, Philippiniana Sacra 26 (May-August 1990): 245.
109Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 198.  See also Roland Paul Blum,
“Emmanuel Levinas’ Theory of Commitment”, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research XLIV (December 1983): 152.
110Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 65-66.
111Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 75.
112Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 171.
113Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 39.
132 Prajna Vihara~
114Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 66.
115Jayme, “Emmanuel Levinas' Philosophy of Responsible Subjectivity”,
252.
116Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 251.
117Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 75.
118Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 199, 201, 230, 251, 297, 302, 303.
119Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 194.
120Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 198.
121Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 198. See also Jeffrey Kosky,  Levinas and
The Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2001),
22.
122Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 198.
123Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 194.
124Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 198.
125Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 199, 201. Here Levinas quotes Plato’s
Republic 327 b.
126David Couzens Hoy, Critical Resistance: From Poststructuralism to
Post-Critique (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2004), 155.
127Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 150.
128Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 200, 203.
129Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 197.
130Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 136.
132Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 89.
133Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 113.
134Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 105.
135Atterton and Calarco explains: “An unargued assumption of many mod-
ern moral philosophers is that the Other only has the right to demand what is his or
legal due, and that anything he or she receives beyond that is purely optional and
a matter of private philanthropy on the part of the benefactor. It has to be said time
and time again that Levinas is opposed to that way of conceiving ethics”. On
Levinas, 70-71.
136Peperzak, To The Other, 221.
137James Richard Mensch, Postfoundational Phenomenology: Husserlian
Reflections on Presence and Embodiment (University Park, Pennsylvania: The
Pennsylvania University Press, 2001), 208.
138Mensch, Postfoundational Phenomenology, 207.
139See Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 108-113.
140Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 108.
141Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 87.
142Mensch, Postfoundational Phenomenology, 208.
143Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 105-106.
144Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 127.
145Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 145.
133Ryan C. Urbano
146Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 11.
147Levinas, Entre Nous, 108.
148Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe
Nemo, trans. R. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985),101.
149Levinas. Otherwise than Being, 139.
150Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 108.
151Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 114.
152Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 183.
153Kosky, Levinas and The Philosophy of Religion, 83.
154Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 102, 55.
155Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 145-146, 149, 152, 185. Here Levinas
reechoes Abraham’s reply to God in the Book of Genesis (Genesis 22:1) when God
commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac. “Here I am” (in Hebrew ‘hineni’ and
Levinas translation in French is  ‘voici’) is the self's unconditional obedience to the
call of the Other.
156Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 101.
157Critchley, “Introduction”, to The Cambridge Companion to Levinas,
20-21.
158Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 25.
159Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 127.
160Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 117-118.
161Michele Saracino, On Being Human: A Conversation with Levinas and
Lonergan (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2003), 96.
162Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 127.
163Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 98.
164Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 100-101.
165Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 101-102.
166Levinas, God, Death and Time, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2000), 12.
167Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 114.
168Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 107.
169Critchley, “Introduction”, in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas,
21.
170Critchley, “Introduction”, in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas,
21.
171Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 74.
172Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 100-101.
173Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 139, 166.
174Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 48-52.
175Levinas, God, Death and Time, 23.
176Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 56.
177Emmanuel Levinas, Of God Who Comes To Mind, translated by Bettina
Bergo (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 63.
134 Prajna Vihara~
178Levinas, God, Death and Time, 23.
179Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 12.
180Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, 72.
181Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 113, 126.
182Peperzak, To The Other, 217. Cf. Roger Burggraeve, The Wisdom of Love
in the Service of Love: Emmanuel Levinas on Justice, Peace and Human Rights,
trans. Jeffrey Bloechl (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2002), 77-83.
183Critchley, “Introduction”, to The Cambridge Companion to Levinas,
12.
184Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 199.
185Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 5.
186Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 92.
187Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 195.
188Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 174.
189Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 76.
190Levinas and Kearney, “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas”, in Face to
Face with Levinas, 29.
191Simons, An-archy and Justice, 51.
192Hoy, Critical Resistance, 158.
193Peperzak, To The Other, 221.
194Davis, Levinas: An Introduction, 75.
195Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 5.
196Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 48.
197Davis, Levinas: An Introduction, 75.
198Davis, Levinas: An Introduction, 45, 49.
199Simons, An-archy and Justice, 51.
200Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 42-43.
201Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 7.
202Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 37-38, 45-48.
203Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 85.
204Davis, Levinas: An Introduction, 79.
205See Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the
Thought of Emmanuel Levinas”, in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 79-153.
206This is the opinion of Jacques Rolland, see Parcours de l’autrement:
Lecture d’Emannuel Levinas (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000), as
cited in Michael B. Smith, Toward the Outside: Concepts and Themes in Emmanuel
Levinas (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2005),148. But Michael B. Smith
holds a different opinion. He says “it would be both unnecessary and unlikely for
Levinas to have shaped his future work on Derrida’s critique”. He is inclined to
believe “that Levinas’s thought already contained, for such an astute reader as
Derrida, the exigencies that were to be worked out until later, but so clearly in-
scribed in potentia that Derrida’s essay was able to decipher some of them”. Smith,
135Ryan C. Urbano
Toward the Outside, 149, 148.
207Levinas is already aware of this weakness in his philosophy, particu-
larly in Totality and Infinity. In his 1962 essay Transcendence and Height, Levinas
writes: “One could reproach it for using classical rationalist terminology and for
mixing it up and dressing it up with empirical givens”. Levinas, “Transcendence
and Height”, Basic Philosophical Writings, 22.
208Simmons, An-archy and Justice, 5.
209Simmons, An-archy and Justice, 5.
210Critchley, “Introduction”, in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas,
18.
211Davis, Levinas: An Introduction, 77.
212Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 47.
213Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 7, 183.
214Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 168.
215Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 167.
216Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 168.
217Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 171.
219Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 212.
220Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 213.
221Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 157.
222See Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 158-161.
223Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 128.
224Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 40.
225Simmons, An-archy and Justice, 54.
226Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 78.
227Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 79.
228Burggraeve, The Wisdom of Love in the Service of Love, 117.
229Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 293; Emmanuel Levinas, “Philosophy and
the Idea of the Infinite” in Peperzak, To the Other, 112.
230Cohen, Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas,
188.
231Kosky, Levinas and The Philosophy of Religion, n. 10, 211.
232Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 23.
233Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 146.
234Wyschogrod, Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphys-
ics, xvii.
235Smith, Toward the Outside, 89. For Smith, God is in the third person
because Levinas wants “an important distinction to be made between the relation
to God and the dialogical relation to the other person”. Levinas intends to depart
from Martin Buber’s implied reciprocity in the “I-Thou” dialogical relation. As Smith
explains: “The dialogical relationship brings with it elements that make it inad-
equate structure for transcendence because of the reciprocity and eventual play of
gratitude and psychological interplay to which both parties of the dialogue are
136 Prajna Vihara~
open. The otherness of the other person is preserved and his or her stature as
“greater than myself safeguarded only if the face of the other is ‘in the trace’ of
illeity. ‘The illeity of the third person is the condition of irreversibility’”. Smith,
Toward the Outside, 89.
236Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 78.
237Cohen, Cohen, Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and
Levinas, 187.
238See Emmanuel Levinas, Is It Righteous To Be?  Interviews with
Emmanuel Levinas, edited by Jill  Robbins (Stanford, California: Stanford Univer-
sity, 2001), 182.
239Michael Purcell, Levinas and Theology (Cambridge, United Kingdom:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2.
240Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 47. Purcell, however, does not here im-
ply “that the subject is the absolute origin of theology. Rather, it means that the
starting point for theological reflection on God takes its point of departure in the
here of human subjectivity”. Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 47.
241Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 2.
242Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 34.
243Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 22.
244Wyschogrod, Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphys-
ics, 62.
245Levinas, God, Death and Time, 15.
246Levinas and Kearney, “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas”, in Face to
Face with Levinas, 24.
247Levinas and Kearney, “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas”, in Face to
Face with Levinas, 25.
248Hent de Vries, “Levinas” in A Companion to Continental Philosophy,
edited by Simon Critchley and William S. Schroeder (Oxford, United Kingdom:
Blackwell, 1998), 246.
249Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 129.
137Ryan C. Urbano
